INTRODUCTION:

Puja and Politics:

The word “puja” comes from Sanskrit, which means “worship” with accompanying rituals showing reverence, honour, homage and adoration. The Hindu puja (deity worship) is a religious practice in most parts of India, but deities like Durga (or the goddess Sakhti Devi, the protector of all that is good and harmonious in the world), Laxmi (the goddess of wealth and prosperity), and Sharashwati (the goddess of knowledge and music) are the most common Hindu religious icons in Bengal.¹

Extending into the first half of the twentieth century, Bengal remained a highly hierarchical society, stratified along the divides of caste, land holding and other possessions of wealth. With the arrival of Muslim traders, mercenaries and sufi saints, which began as early as the eighth and ninth centuries, pockets of conversion to Islam had occurred, but it remains uncertain when and how “mass” conversions to Islam took place among the lower and agrarian castes.² To the lower castes in the hierarchical society, Islam was deemed to be more egalitarian and inclusive. Despite profound changes in religious and political domains in the twenty-first^t century, this article argues that deity puja has remained ingrained in Bengali psyche and this is more evident in Bangladeshi politics, where important dynastic politicians are elevated to the status of deities and are adorned accordingly. Irrespective of political records of these politicians, political party cadres offer unalloyed loyalty, and large followings of voters mobilize and turn up to vote for these political deities.

Large migration of Hindu populations from East Bengal (now Bangladesh) to India occurred at the wake of the partition of the subcontinent in 1947. Pujas, however, continued to be major religious ceremonies in cities and smaller towns, even in remote districts of Bangladesh. In the syncretic Islamic tradition that emerged in Bengal, many rituals of Hinduism and Buddhism became blended.³ The rituals of puja have had psychological impact on political leaders and their support networks. The deity-like status of these leaders reassures them of their charisma and legitimacy. Many leaders are tempted to adopt undemocratic and autocratic measures to hang on to the reins of political power.

Authoritarianism and Ways to Hang on to Power:

Democracy and dictatorship remain in sharp contrast when measured in terms of citizens’ freedom and liberty. Modern forms of non-democratic states include monarchies, military regimes, one-party-dictatorships, and one-dominant-party pseudo democracy.⁴ The Post-cold war wave of democratization has encouraged, in some instances, autocrats to establish “electoral authoritarian” states.⁵ Authoritarianism is characterized by a strong central authority and limited political freedoms. Authoritarian political systems lack genuine political pluralism, bases its legitimacy on emotions and symbols, and discourage social mobilization for change. It allows a single individual or a vanguard party claiming monopoly over power and patronage.⁶ One-party political systems, occasionally with token opposition parties, create a political order that underpins the sole legitimacy of a dominant party to run the government. The proponents of such a system argue that existence of multiple parties with different political and economic agendas run counter to national unity. Evocation of popular phrases such as “freedom struggle”, “emancipation” and “nationalism” are used to identify the chosen party as the vanguard of the people.⁷ Some one-party rules outlaw opposition altogether. Such was the case with the ex-Soviet Union, Saddam Hussain’s Iraq, Muhammar Gadhafi’s Libya and present-day China, Cuba, North Korea and Syria. Others allow token opposition as a part of coalition, such as Zambia under Robert Mugabe and a host of present and past Latin American countries, including Bolivia, Ecuador, Venezuela, and Nicaragua.⁸ One-party systems have traditionally arisen from decolonization, where a leader, an elite group or a party had an overwhelming role in liberation or in independence struggle.⁹ Such regimes often evoke ultra nationalism and fascist practices to stay in power. Autocratic elections are held to ensure continuation of power by employing a range of tactics to ensure these elections are not truly contested.¹⁰ Depending on the characteristics of the autocratic rulers and the institutions created to support them to stay in power, in scholarly analyses, the countries under scrutiny have been variously dabbed as illiberal or pseudo-democracies, electoral authoritarianism and hybrid regimes.

Doctored elections are often conducted by one-party autocratic regimes to provide a veneer of democratic legitimacy. Pliant legislatures with token opposition members allow the dominant party to frame the terms of governance. Concerned about their survival, autocrats involved with one-party rule attempt to build support networks through propaganda, mass subsidies, social welfare programmes and strive to co-opt not only the smaller allied parties, but also other institutions of the government. The bureaucracy and the security forces are coopted as these remain important vehicles for placating the opposition and in discharging own political and economic and social agenda. Segments of allied intelligentsia can be propped up for loyal compendiums and narratives buttressing party ideology and practices.¹¹ A pliant media, use of various forms of bribery, manipulative taxation administration and other government offices, as well as compliant judiciaries are some common agencies to harass and persecute opponents and extort cooperative behavior from critics. Coercion, however, remains the main tool to instil fear and obeisance. Coercion and violence enable autocrats and their party apparatchik to ensure that elections are tampered, and its outcomes are manipulated to prevent a reversal of the fortune of the party.¹² Some regime leaders may appear charismatic, but historically, over years, the crises of legitimacy creep in. Egregious human-rights abuses and economic downturns can create mass upheavals for change. The regional environment in places like the Middle East and Central Asia can support dictators and autocrats sustaining one-party rule for prolonged periods. Changing geopolitical conditions can affect the stability of one-party systems. Muhammar Ghaddafi, Bashar al Asad and Robert Mugabe faced mounting international challenge to their legitimacy because of regional geopolitical changes.

Dynastic Leadership and Authoritarianism in Bangladesh:

After its birth in 1971 through a freedom struggle, Bangladesh has swung between authoritarianism and democracy. While people all over the country, across political divides, took part in the freedom movement, Sheikh Hasina and her party’s (Bangladesh Awami League’s) stalwarts claim to be the sole architects and protagonists in the struggle for independence. Sheikh Hasina’s father, Mujibur Rahman (Mujib) was the key political figure in planning and initiating the war of liberation before he surrendered to the Pakistani military junta.¹³ Mujib, who bears the title of Bangabandhu (friend of Bengal), has been elevated by party stalwarts almost to the level of a mythical deity for his vision and political leadership. After the independence of the country, he returned to Bangladesh to become the country’s Prime Minister. The culture of political intolerance became evident in the first elected government of Bangladesh. The unchallenged leader of the time, Mujibur Rahman, broached no political opposition. He shredded the trapping of democracy, creating one-party rule and prominent members of the cabinet, such as Tajuddin Ahmed who differed with his policies, were eased out into political oblivion.¹⁴

The two main Bangladeshi political parties are the Bangaldesh Awami League (BAL) and the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP). Both parties are cast in autocratic mould with little internal democracy within the workings of the party.¹⁵ Both Sheikh Hasina of BAL and Khaleda Zia of BNP cashed on the popularity of the deceased leaders of their respective parties and claimed office based solely on patrimonial and matrimonial relationship. These leaders themselves had little political capital, but party loyalists offered support to the families of political deities rather than to genuine political leadership contenders who were capable of providing dynamic leadership. On a smaller scale, Hussain General Muhammad Ershad, who came to power through a military coup and a created a third-party, the Bangladesh Jatiyo Party, also began to enjoy a cult-like following in one northern district of the country where he was born.

After the brutal assassination of Mujibur Rahman in 1975, General Ziaur Rahman who was elevated to be the new leader, began to enjoy a cult-like image similar to that of Mujbur Rahman. He was highly regarded as a valiant freedom fighter and a symbol of stability and political tolerance, as he introduced parliamentary democracy in the country. He helped revive the badly bruised BAL so that there would be a viable opposition to his litinewly-created political party, BNP. His assassination by a section of military officers created opportunity for military dictator, General Ershad, to grab power. Zia’s wife eventually claimed the leadership of BNP, just as Mujib’s daughter was given the reins of BAL. Dynastic politics involving two female politicians, a widow and a daughter of deceased political idols, have continued to shape Bangladesh’s chaotic political landscape.

The parliamentary democracy, envisioned in Bangladeshi constitution, suffered due to the one-party systems adopted by Mujibur Rahman, subsequent military interventions and a return to formal democracy with monopolistic influence of political deities. Other important leaders in both parties tend to owe their political strength and legitimacy to these dynastic political deities, not to the party or the constituents. With the blessing of the political deities, the party apparatchik systematically politicizes all important institutions of the government, including the judiciary, the bureaucracy, and the law, which includes enforcement agencies such as the police and para-military forces. The Election Commission, entrusted with conducting free and fair elections, and the investigative agencies, such as the Anti-Corruption Commission (ACC), become pawns at the hands of ruling elites.

The commonalities between deity worship and autocratic leadership remain noteworthy. The political deities, like the religious ones, expect and often receive uncritical loyalty from the political followers. Although these leaders claim to be the leaders of democratic parties, there is little democracy within the functioning of these parties. Differing opinions within the party are muzzled and punished in such a fashion that no recurrence of dissent can occur. Deity politics become vivid during the national elections in the country. Institutional test of democracy is elections that cater for turnover of governments. Elections are indeed major political and social events throughout Bangladesh. During the national elections, the members of parliament, the majority of whom are well off dwellers in the capital city and in other major towns, become active all across the country. While periodic visit to constituents continues, serious attempts to reach out to voters occur during the electioneering period. The candidates carry the posters of political devis (goddesses) and expect the voters to support one or the other goddess, not because what she does for the country, but because of dynastic legacy and political lineage. The two parties offer little choice beyond the two political deities, whose popularity can rise and ebb, but appears to endure in the long-run. A psyche of puja for political deities afflict voting patterns, and choices are often made regardless of honesty, commitment and performance of these political deities. Elections in Bangladesh, when fair and transparent, lead to competitive authoritarianism, but lacking participatory and fair elections, it paves its way toward full-fledged one-party authoritarianism.¹⁶

Regional Spectre of Dynastic Rule and Deity Politics:

Dynastic politics is not a novel phenomenon typical to Bangladesh and prevails in other countries in Asia.¹⁷ Many other dynastic leaders have flourished across the developing countries, but interestingly, other dynastic political deities in Asia did not enjoy puja and adoration to the same level that the political clout deities in Bangladesh continue to have.¹⁸ Benazir Bhutto in Pakistan carried the legacy of the populist leader, Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto. Her son, Bilawal Bhutto Zardari, became chairperson of the Pakistan’s Peoples Party at the age of 19, when Benazir was assassinated in 2007. Sri Lanka’s political icon, Sirimavo Bandaranaike, was brought forward to the limelight as the legitimate successor after the assassination of her charismatic husband, S.W.R.D. Bandaranaike, in 1959.

Mrs. Bandarnaike entered politics in 1960 as a Senator, and after the national election in the country the same year, she became the first female prime minister in the world.¹⁹ Bandaranaike faced serious political challenges during her tenure in office. Within a year of her 1960 election victory, she declared a "state of emergency". This followed a “civil disobedience” campaign by the country's minority Tamil population who were outraged by the discriminatory politics towards the minorities. In the second election, her party won a majority of seats, but her government become unpopular even among the mainstream Sihala population. Fearing electoral defeat, Bandaranaike used a clause of the 1972 constitution to delay elections until 1977. Her party won only a handful of seats in the election, forcing her exit from politics.²⁰ Her daughter, Chandrika Bandaranaike Kumaratunga, later on entered politics to become the Prime Minister in 1994. She became the President in 1999 and held office until 2005.²¹ Although Kumaratunga enjoyed a deity-like status, she found it difficult to make a political come back. Sri Lankan constitution formally bars the seeking office of the president for more than two terms.²² None of the Sri Lankan dynastic leaders degenerated into autocrats or created a one-party authoritarianism.

Indonesia’s Megawati Sukarnoputri, daughter the charismatic leader of the freedom struggle, Sukarno, saw only one term as the president in July 2001, when the People's Consultative Assembly (MPR) removed President Abdurrahman Wahid from office and swore in Megawati as the new president. The rise of an iconic opposition leader against General Muhammad Suharto’s entrenched political machinery was initially widely welcomed by Indonesians of all stripes. Her presidency soon became plagued with indecisiveness, lack of clear ideological direction, and policy inaction. She ran for re-election in 2004 in the country's first direct presidential election, hoping to cash in her deceased father’s deity-like appeal, but was decisively defeated marking an end of dynastic politics in Indonesia.²³

Closer to Bangladesh, India’s Indira Gandhi, the daughter of the first Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru, began to enjoy deity-like statue after her father’s death. She quickly rose up the political ladder to become India’s Prime Minister in 1966. Faced with mounting political opposition, she showed a strong propensity towards establishing one-party hegemony in India. She declared “a state of emergency” in 1975, curtailing fundamental rights and political opposition. Interestingly, this was occurring at a time when the newly-independent Bangladesh had turned into a one-party state. She was defeated in the 1977-elections but returned to power in 1980. The political life of this deity came to an end in 1984, when she was killed by her Sikh bodyguards.²⁴ Dynastic politics has continued even after Gandhi’s death. Her son, Rajiv Gandhi, entered politics and became the Prime Minster in 1984. In 2017, her grandson, Rahul Gandhi, was elected as the president of the Congress Party of India, of which Nehru was a founding member.²⁵

While dynastic politics continue to prevail in South Asia and in other parts of world, with scions rising to political office, political deities based on family lineage have not enjoyed the durability or the extensive clout of the Bangladeshi dynastic leaders. The Koirala family in Nepal is beginning to lose firm grip over power, Bilawal Bhutto in Pakistan is still struggling to cement his political platform, and Rahul Gandhi in India, even after a long process of political mentorship, has not yet fully flourished in the complexity Indian politics. The culture of deity puja in Bengal serves to explain the prolific success of the two dynastic leaders and their autocratic grip over the party leadership. Deity politics could have equally prevailed in West Bengal where Durga and other goddesses are venerated. Indian federal politics seem to have a moderating influence on the sway of local political deities and their autocratic tendencies. Just as these Bangladeshi political deities love to enjoy unchallenged and unrivalled loyalty from political followers, the large swaths of voters support these leaders in the ways that deities are worshipped. This helps convince these leaders that they are the true and divine representatives of the people of Bangladesh.

Records of Dynastic Scions and Political Deities:

Much has been documented on corruption, human rights abuses, and lack of social and economic justice in Bangladesh. Unending political deadlock between BAL and BNP, involving tension over competing narratives of national identity, has narrowed political discourse, engendered political violence and eroded of the rule of law.²⁶ Politics are emotionally charged with frequent street violence, abduction of opposition leaders and targeted killings. Quality of governance under both Khaleda Zia and Sheikh Hasina remain, at best, questionable. Both leaders and their families have faced allegations of corruption. The two sons of Khaleda wielded a great deal of influence on the country’s trade and commerce. Her elder son saw rapid rise in political fortune based on dynastic claims. Egregious crimes such as the grenade attack on Sheikh Hasina in 2005 received little investigative attention during BNP’s rule. Islamist militancy was on the rise and Khaleda was slow to respond to that emanant threat. She politicized the military, bringing all the cronies of her family to the helm of military hierarchy. Ironically, in an attempt to protect their political and material gains, these cronies staged a silent coup against Khaleda and exiled her sons in 2007.

Sheikh Hasina returned to power for a second tenure in 2009 through an election conducted by a military-dominated care-taker government. Although deemed fair by some quarters, the election remained heavily biased toward BAL, as BNP leaders were either exiled or extensively discredited by the military dominated care-taker government.²⁷ The election gave Hasina more than two-thirds majority in the country’s parliament. She continued the policy of cronyism and patronizing political corruption. The politicization of the security forces and the bureaucracy reached an all time high. Before the end of her tenure in 2013, she changed the constitution, placating the possibility of holding fair election that had ensured turnover governments since 2000. For Hasina, it is now her third term in office as the Prime Minister. The election of 2014 was particularly controversial, when the major opposition parties questioned her government’s electoral machinations and boycotted the polls. What the election created was a de-facto one-party rule with all the features of an autocratic regime. Violence, corruption and human-rights abuses became rampant in Bangladesh.

Billions of dollars have been siphoned off the country’s banks with the collusion of political stalwarts and government institutions being riven by corruption. The ACC has been used flagrantly to implicate and jail political opponents. Bludgeoning the opposition and clamping down on the regime’s critics have become synonymous with Hasina’s rule. She now wields dictatorial powers which have made her family political colleagues wealthy, powerful and above law. She has banned criticism of her father, Mujibur Rahman, as this would tantamount to sedition, punishable with lengthy jail terms. Judicial independence, free from control by the executive, can give judges an opening to uphold the rule- of- law and protect democratic institutions. The country’s top Supreme Court Judge was forced to retire in 2018 when he attempted to uphold some constitutional safeguards against Hasina’s autocratic rules. The judge was eventually forced to leave the country and now he faces dubious corruption charges raised against him by the ACC. The country’s higher courts are now, allegedly, staked with justices with close ties to the government. Independent media outlets could play a critical watchdog by investigating and exposing malfeasance, but mindful of of government reprisals, they have been forced to observe restrain and self-censorship. Even jokes and caricatures of Hasina, including negative social media posts, have led to arrests by law-enforcing agencies. According to the Bertelsmann Transformation Index (BTI) 2018, Bangladesh, alongside countries such as Nicaragua, Mozambique and Uganda, has transformed itself into an autocracy.²⁸

Irrespective of the quality of governance of the regime and its gross human- rights abuses, Hasina commands a deity-like stature among her party workers. She remains the chief source of patronage for party workers at all levels and expects unalloyed support and obeisance from them. The country’s prisons overflow their capacities as opposition politicians and activists are routinely jailed, and she has stepped up onslaught on the judiciary and the press.²⁹ Media and press have been muzzled the way it is done in typical autocratic regimes. The ordinary citizen remains wary of expressing personal views about the quality of governance in Bangladesh. The judiciary in the country has been increasingly malleable and even the top judges are purged for not towing the policies of the government. A rising Islamist militancy has been met with iron force, with little attempt to understand the prevailing political, social, economic environment that promotes violence and extremism. The country’s security forces aggressively target political opponents, which most observers consider to be Hasina’s political strategy to engineer doctored elections to remain in power. The BNP leader Khaleda has been imprisoned on what most observers see as politically-motivated graft charges. Students protests in 2018 demanding a nonpartisan fairer access to government jobs, and rallied for road-safety from an unruly and mafia-led transportation system, have met heavy-handed reprisals. In August 2018, one prominent photojournalist who reported to foreign media on the students’ protests, was imprisoned. Several other journalists were also assaulted and injured by the police and pro-government thugs during these high school students’ protests. Unprecedented autocratic and unconstitutional administrative measures adopted by the government have undone much of the democratic progress the country had made since the institution of democracy in the early 1990s. According to the Human Right Watch of 2018³⁰:

The Bangladesh government has intensified its crackdown on civil society, media, and critics. Authorities have killed and disappeared members of the political opposition, while failing to protect bloggers, gay rights activists, and religious minorities from violent and often fatal attacks by militant groups. The government’s response to extremist violence has perpetuated security forces’ long-standing use of arbitrary arrests, enforced disappearances, and extrajudicial killings. Rights to freedom of speech and assembly are under sustained attack by the increasingly authoritarian government.

While political records of Bangladeshi dynastic deities are ridden with corruption, nepotism and political violence, alternative political forces find it hard to survive. In a culture of clientelist politics, political patronage monopolised by deity-like leaders and political challenges are easily sidelined or eliminated. These include, among others, an eminent lawyer, Dr. Kalam Hussain, who was Mujibur Rahman’s compatriot, and the Nobel Laureate economist, Mohammad Yunus, whose attempts to make political inroads against the political prima donnas in Bangladesh met with dismal failures. Similar attempts by reputed politicians such as ex-President Badruddoza Chowdhury and General Zia’s colleague and one-time party stalwart, Wali Ahmed, did not receive much traction in Bangladeshi politics. Before Khaleda went to prison in early 2018, she nominated her exiled son, who is relatively junior in BNP politics, as the acting party chairman, which depicts dynastic stranglehold on BNP’s top leadership. Many BAL party leaders who touted politics sans Sheikh Hasina during the de-facto military rule from 2007-2008 eventually had to succumb to the stronger party pressure, which upheld the party’s dynastic deity. Many quarters believe that Hasina is grooming her son, Sajeeb Wajed Joy, who is now an advisor to the BAL government, to pick up the reins of party leadership.

Despite some positive developments in economic growth and macroeconomic stability over the last two decades, the economic and social inequality gap continue to widen, creating large pools of educated and unemployed youths. Overall, socio-political environment in the country continues to deteriorate with an alarming possibility of local jihadist groups connecting with transnational terrorism. The prospects of the rise of Islamic militancy in an environment of poor governance and deteriorating rule of law, portend new forms of militancy that could threaten the country’s security and religious tolerance. Incidents of Islamic militancy are often given political hue. For some grisly murders and lynchings, the government blamed the opposition rather than Islamic extremists. According to the International Crisis Group:

With political polarisation reaching historic highs and local jihadist groups forging links with transnational movements, new forms of militancy threaten security and religious tolerance in Bangladesh. The government should reinforce the capability of law enforcement agencies and the judiciary and build political consensus on tackling the menace.³¹

Bangladesh's government, led by Sheikh Hasina, was re-elected in a landslide vote towards the end of 2018. The BAL-led coalition won an astounding 288 out of 300 parliamentary seats. In the lead up to the elections, as many as 14,000 opposition political activists were sent to prison. According to several reporters and election observers, the night before the elections ballot boxes were stuffed by police in collaboration with BAL party workers. Following this contrived, farcical, and “peaceful” election, opposition parties have rejected the election results and called for new elections.

Deity Politics and Rising Authoritarianism:

Bangladesh gained independence twice: once from the British Raj in 1947 and later from Pakistan in 1970. Ethnically nearly homogenous, the country grapples with its ideological mooring, domestic political turmoil and a threatening population bulge. Experimentation with electoral politics and military dictatorship has not made the country any wiser in addressing its entrenched corruption and violence-ridden political culture, and the daunting socio-economic challenges. Cultivation of political deity culture has stifled and weakned the institutions that could promote checks and balances. A widow-and-daughter phenomenon serves to the legitimize political pre-eminence of dynastic deities and strengthens dynastic stranglehold on the country’s politics. In a land long-accustomed to deity worship, both leaders are now treated by their political followers as divine deities, deserving uncritical loyalty and adoration. Although autocratic leaders have thrived in many other places in the world, the culture of deity puja in Bangladesh seems to have helped its leaders to increase their political stranglehold, and suffocate and trample democratic institutions, making the broader public opinion outside the circles of party devotees inconsequential. Restrictions imposed on free media prevents genuine public debate about these deity-like dynastic leaders and, thus, constrain strengthening of democratic institutions in the country and foster a supportive environment for authoritarianism. Many close observers of Bangladeshi politics remain apprehensive that the prevailing culture of political intolerance could give rise to more radical terrorist groups.

Authoritarian governments can face serious challenges to popular legitimacy when involving egregious human rights abuses and openly cancelling or stealing elections, but a culture of political puja tends to protect and promote the Bangladeshi political deities. Irrespective of their political records, political cadres, supporters, and loyal party ideologues elevate these Bangladeshi political devis to the status of deities and support them uncritically. This engenders room for these popular leaders to conduct themselves undemocratically and foster autocratic governance in the country. Dynastic politics, and the culture of deity puja remain intertwined. A worshiped-worshiper relationship manifests in Bangladeshi politics, beginning with the era of Mujibur Rahman to that of the current dynastic leaders. With such ethos of puja continuing to pervade Bangladeshi politics, there appears no near-term nation-wide campaign for a corrective course that would address intuitional atrophy and a return to competitive democracy. The puja culture will only augment autocratic trends with parties formally accepting the tenets of multiparty polity, but maintaining their claims to power through autocratic elections.

REFERENCES:

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2. Ahmad, Aziz (1964). Studies in Islamic Culture in the Indian Environment, Oxford: Clarendon Press and Eaton, Richard M. (1993) The Rise of Islam and the Bengal Frontier, 1204-1760, University of California Press and Wise, James (1894) “The Muhammadans of Eastern Bengal,” Journal of the Asiatic Society of Bengal 63 (28).

3. Roy, Asim (1983). Islamic Syncretic Tradition in Bengal, Sterling Publishers, New Delhi.

4. Magaloni, Beariz and Kricheli, Ruth (2010) “Political Order and One-Party Rule”, Annual Review of Political Science, 13(24).

5. Cox, Gary W. (2007). “Authoritarian elections and leadership succession, 1975-2000” Department of Political Science, University of California, San Diego, pp.1-21, November 12 (unpublished manuscript) as quoted in Schedler, Andreas (2010) “Transitions from Electoral Authoritarianism” # 222, CIDE, Mexico.

6. Shorten, Richard (2012) Modernism and Totalitarianism: Rethinking the Intellectual Sources of Nazism and Stalinism, 1945 to the Present, Palgrave Macmillan, p. 256.

7. Magaloni and Kricheli, (2010), pp. 123-143 for detailed account of logic, legitimacy of problems of various forms of one-party rule.

8. See Balderacchi, Claudio (2018). “Political leadership and the construction of competitive authoritarian regimes in Latin America: implications and prospects for democracy”, Democratization, 25(3), pp. 504-523

9. Magaloni and Kricheli (2010).

10. Knutsen, Carl Henrik, Nygard, Havard Mokleiv and Wig, Tore (2015) “Autocratic Elections: Stabilizing Tool or Force for Change?”, Peace Research Institute Oslo, Department of Political Science, University of Oslo, December, pp. 1-37.

11. Greene, Kenneth F. (2010). “Political economy of authoritarian single party dominance”, Comparative Political Studies, 43(7) pp. 807-834

12. See Stier, Sebastian (2015). “Democracy, autocracy and the news: the impact of regime type on media freedom” Democratization, 22:7, , pp.1273-1295, for a discussion on control of media by autocratic regimes.

13. Jahan, Rounaq (1973). "Bangladesh in 1972: Nation Building in a New State". Asian Survey. 13 (2), pp. 199-210.

14. Rashid, Harun-or- (2012). "Rahman, Bangabandhu Sheikh Mujibur" in In Islam, Sirajul and Jamal, Ahmed. et.al. 2012. Banglapedia: National Encyclopedia of Bangladesh (Second edn.), Asiatic Society of Bangladesh, Dhaka,.

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16. Levitsky, Steven and Way, Lucan A. (2002) “Elections Without Democracy- Rise of Competitive Authoritarianism” Journal of Democracy, 13:2

17. Chibber, Pradeeb (2013). “Dynastic parties; Organization, finance and impact”, Party Politics, 19(2), p.277.

18. Derichs, Claudia and Thompson, Mark R. (2013) Dynasties and Female Political Leaders in Asia: Gender, Power and Pedigree, Vienna, Zurich: LIT Verlag.

19. “1960: Ceylon chooses world's first woman PM, On This Day” BBC, Retrieved 21 July 2016

20. Ibid.

21. www.britannica.com/biography/Chandrika-Bandaranaike-Kumaratunga#ref701597 accessed on March 2, 2018

22. http://www.president.gov.lk accessed on January 23, 2018.

23. Ziegenhain, Patrick (2008). The Indonesian Parliament and Democratization, Singapore: ISEA Publishing Cambridge p.146; Beittinger-Lee, Verena (2009). (Un) Civil Society and Political Change in Indonesia: A Contested Arena, Routledge; Friend, Theodore (2003). Indonesian Destinies, The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press.

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26. See “Political Extremism and Criminal Justice”, International Crisis Group Report No. 277 April 2016, Riaz, Ali (2013) “Bangladesh in Turmoil”, Congressional Testimony, United States House of Representative, and Khan, M. Adil (2017) “Bangladesh’s Governance Decay: A Case of Leadership Betrayal?” countercurrents.org, https://countercurrents.org/2017/08/05/bangladeshs-governance-decay-a-case-of-leadership-betrayal, accessed on January 30, 2018.

27. Some accounts suggest the military leadership wanted earnestly an AL-led government to prevent reprisals against the military’s usurping the BNP’s democratically elected government.

28. “Is Bangladesh becoming an autocracy?” https://www.dw.com/en/is-bangalesh-becoming-an-autoracy/a-4315170 accessed on October 12, 2018.

29. Riaz, Ali (2014) “Crisis of Democracy in Bangladesh” Current History, 113(762) pp.150-156

30. Human Rights Watch, 2018, https://www.hrw.org/asia/bangladesh, accessed on January 30, 2018

31. “Countering Jihadist Militancy in Bangladesh” International Crisis Group, Report 295 / Asia, February 28, 2018.

Received on 08.11.2018 Modified on 18.01.2019

Int. J. Rev. and Res. Social Sci. 2019; 7(2):309-315.

DOI: 10.5958/2454-2687.2019.00020.0